



RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.'
SECOND ARTICLE.
Having noticed these two classes of cases, which belong rather
to the law of sale in general, than to the branch of stoppage in
transitu, let us examine the rules which govern the largest class of
cases which have arisen under this branch of the law.
In the first place, what is the nature of the transitus in which the
goods may be stopped?
In the case of Stokes vs. La Biviere2 Lord Mansfield said, that
goods may be stopped "in every sort of transitus to the hands of
the buyer. Ships in harbor, carriers, bills, have been stopped. In
-short, while the goods are in transitu, the seller has that proprietary
lien" (right).
In Mill8 vs. Ball,3 Lord Alvanley said, "the vendor may stop
them (the goods) at any time before they have arrived in such a
state as to be in the actual or constructive possession of the buyer."
SBuat to this general rule we shall find several limitations.
It makes no difference whether the goods are in motu or not, for
if they are in the hands of one who holds them merely as agent to
IConcluded from page 591.
8 East, 397. 3 2 B. & P. 461.
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forward, they are as much in transitu as if they were actually mov-
ing.' Thus if goods have been sent to a wharf to be forwarded to
the vendee, as in Smith vs. Goss ;2 or if they have arrived by sea
to be sent thence by land, as in Mills vs. Ball;3 or if in the hands
of the packer,' as at an intermediate stand, they are still in transitu.
In the case of Coates vs. Bailton,5 where R. was in the habit of
buying goods for Buller, and sending them to him at Lisbon, it was
held that goods in R.'s hands were in transitu to Lisbon. In the
case of 2Torthey vs. Field," goods deposited in the king's warehouse
previous to the payment of the duties, were held to be in transitu
to the vendee. In the case of Edwards vs. Brewer,7 goods left in
the wharfinger's hands, not in the vendee's name, but entered in the
books in blank with freight and charges annexed, were held to be in
transitu to the vendee. And even after the arrival and discharge
of the vessel, but before the goods are taken possession of in the
vendee's name, the vendor may stop them.'
It was formerly held, in the case of Inglis vs. Us/i erwood,9 that
goods on board a vessel chartered by the vendee, were actually
I Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East, 175; Dodson vs. Wentworth, 5 Scott N. R., 821; 4
A. & G. 1080. "The principle being," says Tindal, Ch. J., "that the delivery of
the goods to the appointed agents of the vendee, from whom the agents were to
receive orders as to the ultimate destination of the goods, puts an end to the right
of stoppage in transitu." Wentworth vs. Outhwaite, 5 1. & W. 436.
Valpy vs. Gibson, London Jurist for 1847, p. 826. In this last case the vendors
had sent the goods to the shipping agents of the vendee, but the vendee sent them
back to be repacked and became insolvent while they were in the vendors' hands;
held, that the vendors could not retain them against the vendee's assignees.
2 1 Camp. 282; Corell vs. Hitchcock, 23 Wend. 611.
3 2 B. & P. 457; Buckley vs. Furniss, 15 Wend. 137.
4 Hunt vs. Ward, cited 3 T. R. 467. Or if in the hands of an engraver or other
artificer; Owenson vs. Morse, 7 T. R. 64.
6 6B. & C. 422.
6 2 Esp. 613; Nix vs. Olive, Abb. on Sh. 643. In Donath vs. Bromhead, 7 Barr,
301, the vendee paid the freight; but, in consequence of the loss of the invoice,
the goods were stored in the custom house. Held, that the vendor might retake
them, they being considered still in transitu.
7 2 M. & W. 375.
8 Naylor vs. Dennie, 8 Pick. 108; Tucker vs. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516; Allen is.
Mercier, 1 Ash. 103. 9 1 East, 515.
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delivered. But it has been subsequently decided, that it must
depend upon the power of the vendee over the vessel.' It makes
no difference by whom the carrier is appointed ;' while the goods
are in the hands of a common carrier or freighter, to whom the
vendee has to pay freight money, they may be stopped.' But if
the delivery be into the vendee's own wagon, or on board his own
ship, or on board a vessel temporarily his and under his absolute
control, the right of stoppage is gone, for the driver of the wagon
and the captain of the ship are his servants. The true distinction
then seems to be, that if the bailee into whose hands the goods are
put is the immediate servant of the vendee, the delivery is com-
plete; but if he is a public servant, or subject to the orders of any
other person, then the right of stoppage continues over the goods
while in his possession.
This distinction was recognized in the case of BosThtlingh vs.
Inglis,4 where the ship being merely chartered for the voyage, the
captain was the servant of the shipowner; in the case of 1owlir
vs. McTaggart5 where the vessel being wholly under the control of
the vendee, the captain was his servant; and in the case of Bolin
vs. .Huffnagle,0 where the vendee being owner of the ship, delivery
on board was considered the same as delivery into his warehouse.
7
I Cross on Lien, 301-311; Abbott on Sh. Book iv. ch. 1.
2 Nicholls vs. Fenore, 2 Bing. N. C. 81.
Judge Story, in the case of Marcardier vs. Chesapeake Ins. Co., (8 Cr. 39,)
says: "A person may be owner for the voyage, who by a contract with the general
owner hires the ship for the voyage, and has the exclusive possession, command,
and navigation. Such is the case of Vallejo vs. Wheeler, (Comp. 143.) But where
the general owner retains the possession, command, and navigation of the ship,
and contracts to convey a cargo on freight for the voyage, the charter-party is con-
sidered a mere affreightment sounding in covenant, and the freighter is not clothed
with the character or legal responsibility of ownership; such was the case of Hoe
vs. Groveman," (1 Cr. 214.)
1 3 East., 381. 5 Cited 7 T. R. 442. 6 1 Rawle, 18.
7 The decision of Ch. T. Parsons, in Stubbs vs. Lund, (7 Mass. 453,) militates
against previous and subsequent decisions on this point, and the ground upon which
he appears to found his decision, namely: that goods may be stopped on board the
vendee's own vessel, if they are to be carried to the vendee,-seems to us to be
untenable. It is in direct opposition to the common law of delivery, and to the
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Another limitation upon the general right of stoppage arises
from the destination of the goods. If the goods are shipped not
to be carried to the vendee, but to be exported to some other
place, or person, the right of stoppage.is gone upon delivery to the
carrier. The general rule is stated to be, that if no further deli-
very than that to the carrier is contemplated by the parties, and no
actual possession is intended by the consignee, there the transit is
at an end.1
In the case of Noble vs. Adams,2 the vendors having suffered the
shipmaster to give the vendee an absolute and unconditional receipt
without taking one to themselves, it was held "that they could not
stop the goods in their subsequent transitus."
Secondly.-When is the transitus ended ?
The simplest case of the termination of the transitus is where the
vendee has got the goods into his actual possession. But if he is
accustomed to use the warehouse of another as his own, either as a
permanent place of deposit,3 or until a new destination is given to
the goods,4 or by consent of the vendor keeps them in the vendor's
warehouse,, or if his agent is accustomed to keep them until he
receive further orders,' in each case the transitus is at an end when
they arrive at such place of deposit. In the case of -Leeds vs.
principle maintained in Fowler vs. McTaggart, I East, 522; Inglis vs. Usherwood
1 East, 515; Lawes on Charter-parties, 492; Holt on Shipping, 504.
In Bolin vs. Huffnagle, 1 Rawle, 18, Ch. J. Parsons' decision is much commented
upon and overruled. When goods are once put into a person's hands, they are
absolutely delivered; and we do not see -what difference it will make whatever he
may subsequently do with them. Bell's Comm. 127; Brown on Sales, 451.
1 Stubbs vs. Lund, 7 Mass. 458; Rowley vs. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307 ; Boshtlingh
vs. Schneider, 3 Esp. 58; Fowler vs. McTaggart, 7 T. R. 442; 3 East, 396.
Holt, 248.
s As in Richardson vs. Goss, 3 B. & P. 127; Rowe vs. Pickford, 8 Taunt. 83;
Allen vs. Gripper, 2 C. & J. 218; Dodson vs. Wentworth, 5 Scott N. R. 821.
4 Rowe vs. Pickford, 1 Moore, 526; Foster vs. Frampton, 6 B. & C. 107; Gerard
vs. Nightingale, cited in Cross on Lien, 412.
5 Barrett vs. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107.
6 Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East, 175; 6 B. & C. 107; 2 Kent, 545; Dodson vs.
Wentworth, 6 Lend. Jur. 1066.
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Vright,l M. of London bought goods for L. G. & Co., of Paris;
but had the power of sendipg them whenever he chose, or of selling
them again in London. The court held, that delivery to M. put
an end to the transitus. In the case of Scott vs. Petit,2 Lord
.lvanley said, "1 here there being no other place of delivery than
the warehouse of the packer, the goods, when they came there, had
come to their last place of delivery, and consequently were no
longer liable to the right of stoppage in transitu." And if they
have come into the possession, actual or constructive, of those to
whom the original vendee has transferred his- rights, as of his
Vendee or assignees, the transitus is terminated.' In the case of
Wrzight vs. Zawes, it was decided, that if the goods be deposited
in a warehouse hired by the vendee's agent for the purpose, and the
vendee comes and exercises any act of ownership over them, the
transitus will be determined, though it is intended that they shall
afterwards be forwarded from their first place of deposit to the
vendee's abode ; and in subsequent cases the marking,- taking sam-
pies,0 giving delivery order,7 have been held sufficient acts of owner-
ship to divest the vendor's right of stoppage.
In the case of Holst vs. Pownall, in 1795, Lord Kenyon decided
that the vendee could not meet the goods upon their journey, and
by taking possession divest the vendor's right of stoppage, and his
decision was confirmed by the King's Bench. The facts of the case
1 3 B. & P. 320; Coates vs. Railton, 6 B. & C. 422; Rowley vs. Bigelow, 12 Pick.
307; Stubbs vs. Lund, 7 Mass. 453.
2 3 B. & P. 469. In the case of Ueletopulo vs. Ranking, 6 Load. Jur. 1095,
A. employed B. to buy a cargo of currants, and to deliver them at Vostizza, at
which place they were to be shipped for England. Held, that B. had a right of
stoppage until they arrived at Vostizza, but not over their subsequent tranitus.
3 Ellis vs. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464; Dixon vs. Yates, 5 B. & Ad. 346 Scott. vs. Petit,
3 B. & P. 469. Or into the hands of the vendee's administrator or executor. Cony-
ers vs. Ennis, 2 Mason, 236; Newhall vs. Vargas, 13 Me. 93.
44 Esp. 82. In this case the acts of examining and tasting were considered suf-
ficient acts of ownership.
5 Ellis vs. Hunt, 3 T. R. 464. Foster vs. Frampton, 5 B. & C. 107.
7 Harman vs. Anderson, 2 Camp. 243; Hollingsworth vs. Napier, 3 Caines, 182.
Entering goods at the custom house was held a sufficient act of ownership, in
Moltram vs. Heyer, 1 Denio, 483. 8 1 Esp. 240.
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were these: The plaintiffs, in 1792, sold D. & Co. a cargo of fruit.
Before the cargo reached Liverpool, D. & Co. failed, and the plain-
tiffs sent orders to their agent to stop it. The vessel arrived June
9th, 1793, and was ordered out to perform quarantine; but on the
9th the assignees took possession, and put two persons on board;
on the 17th of June the agent of the vendors claimed the cargo.
Lord Kenyon held, that the voyage was not over until the quaran-
tine was performed, and that the consignees could not obtain pos-
session until the completion of the voyage.
This opinion we boldly pronounce inaccurate, and upon the fol-
lowing authorities: Only six years afterwards, in the case of
Mills vs. Ball,1 Lord Alvanley treated the question as quite settled,
"that, though the right of stoppage continues until the goods have
reached their journey's end, yet if the vendee meet them upon the
road and take them into his own possession, the goods will then
have arrived at their journey's end, with reference to the right of
stoppage in transitu." In Whitehead vs. Anderson,2 in 1842,
Parke, B., in delivering the judgment of the court, says: "If the
vendee take them out of the possession of the carrier into his own,
with or without the consent of the carrier, there seems to be no
doubt that the transit would be at an end." The same opinion was
g'ven by Chambre, J., in the case of Oppenheim vs. Bussel,3 in 1802 ;
and by Rogers, J., in Bolin vs. Huffnagle;4 and in WTright vs.
Lawes,5 where goods, bought by a person residing in Norwich, were
delivered into his possession at Yarmouth, on their way to Norwich;
it was held that they were no longer in transitu.
A delivery of part of the goods, sold under one and the same
contract, is delivery of the whole ;' but this rule is governed by the
intention of the parties. If the vendor intended to deliver the
2B. &P. 461. 9 M. & W. 618. 38 B. &P. 54.
4 1 Rawle, 17. So in Jordon vs. James, 5 Ham. 88. 2 Kent, 546; Blackmore
on Sale, 254.
r4 Esp. 82; Chitty's Commercial Law, 350.
6 Slubey vs. Heyward, 2 H. B1. 504; Hammond vs. Anderson, 1 B. & P. N. R. 69.
The delivery of part is held to take away the right of stoppage, unless there be
circumstances to show that it was not intended to operate as a delivery of the
whole. Betts vs. Gibbens, 4 N. & M. 76.
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whole, then a partial delivery divests his right to stop the remain-
der ;' but if the intention was that the vendee should have only a
part, or if the carrier retains a part to secure his freight, the deli-
very is incomplete. Thus in Bunney vs. Poyntz, the vendee asked
permission to take away a part, so that there was a manifest inten-
tion to separate it from the residue; held, that the delivery was not
complete. In Orayshaw vs. £ades,3 where a carrier unloaded part
of a cargo, but hearing of the insolvency of the consignee, re-loaded'
it; held, that there was no delivery. In the case of Bukcey vs.
Purniss,4 the goods were forwarded in separate parcels ; the vendor
stopped one of them ; the stoppage as to- that one was held good.
In Jones vs. Jones,5 the assignee of the vendee took possession of
as much of the cargo as he could dispose of, and forwarded the
remainder; held, that the intention being to take possession of the
whole, the delivery was complete. In Poster vs. Franzpton,6 the
taking of samples was considered such an act of ownership, with
respect to the whole, that the delivery was held complete; and in
.Dixon vs. Yates,7 a similar act of the vendee was held not to be a
taking possession of the whole.
The possession of custom house officers, or of persons holding the
goods by act of law, or without any privity of contract with the
vendee, does not divest the consignor's right.s
The vendor's right of stoppage may be divested before the'termi-
nation of the transitus by the assignment of the bill of lading.
We have already seen that upon the completion of the bargain
I Simmons vs. Swift, 5 B. & C. 857. ',The presumption is, that the pait delivery
is intended as a delivery of the whole; but it may be rebutted." Story on Con-
tracts, 525. Wentworth vs. Onthwaite, 10 M. & W. 436; Exp. Gwynne, 12 Yes.
Jr. 379; Williams vs. Moore, 5 N. H. 285; Hanson vs. Meyer, 6 East, 614.
2 4 B. & Ad. 568; vide et etiam Hurry vs. Mangles, 1 Camp. 452; Miles vs.
Gorton, 2 C. & M. 500; Jones vs. Jones, 1 M. & W. 431.
S 1 B. & C. 181. 4 17 Wend. 514.
5 8 M. & W. 431 ; vide et etiam Macomber vs. Parker, 13 Pick. 175.
6 6 B. & C. 107 ; Hinde vs. Whitehouse, 7 East, 558.
75 B. & Ad. 813 ; Bloxam vs. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 947.
s Per J. Sprague, in Burnham vs. Windsor, 5 Law Reporter, 507; Northey vs.
Field, 2 Esp. 613; Donath vs. Bromhead, 7 Barr, 301.
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the vendee acquires the general right of property,' subject to the
vendor's right of stoppage in case of insolvency. This right of
property the vendee may transfer without any documentary evi-
dence of possession on his part, or of delivery to his vendee, but he
can transfer no greater right than he himself has. 2  In order to
make a complete transfer of the property, the vendee must have a
bill of lading endorsed to him, 3 or he must be the person therein
named to receive the goods.' This bill he must endorse' to his sub-
vendee for a valuable consideration,6 and in furtherance of a bona
fide contract to confer an interest in the goods.7 And, lastly, the
transferree must takes the bill without knowledge of such circum-
stances as render the bill not fairly and honestly assignable.
It is not necessary that the bill should be endorsed in furtherance
of a contract to transfer the -whole interest in the goods. Lick-
barrow vs. Mlason, ° is itself a case of pledge, and the vendor's right
IEmptio et venditio contrahitur simul atque do pretio convenerit quamvis non-
dum pretium numeratum sit. Domat, 1, 2, 3: 2.
2 Traditio nihil amplius transferre debet vel potest, ad earn, qui accepit, quam
est apud earn, qui tradit. Ulpianus.
Nathan vs. Giles, 5 Taunt. 558; Nix vs. Olive, Abb. on Sh. 643. (Unless, of
course, the bill is endorsed in blank.)
4 Tucker vs. Humphrey, 4 Bing. 516; Stanton vs. Eager, 16 Pick. 467; Abb. on
Sb. 633. 5 Kinlock vs. Craig, 3 T. R. 219.
6 Waring vs. Core, 1 Camp. 369; Coxe vs. Harden, 4 East, 211.
Patten vs. Thompson, 5 M. & S. 350. An assignment as collateral security,
and subsequent endorsement of the bill of lading, held to divest the consignor's
right in Lempriere vs. Pasley, 2 T. & R. 485; Walter vs. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. R.
283.
8 On the necessity of the delivery of the bill, vide Buffington vs. Curtis, 15
Blass. 528.
9 Lickbarrow vs. Mason, 2 T. R. 63 ; Wright vs. Campbell, 4 Burr. 2051 ; Evans
vs. Martlett, 1 Ld. Raym., 271; Illsley vs. Stubbs, 9 Mass. 65; Stubbs vs. Lund, 7
Mass. 453; Walter vs. Ross, 2 Wash. C. C. 283; Salomans vs. Nissen, 2 T. R. 681;
Hibbert vs. Carter, I T. R. 745 ; Caldwell vs. Ball, 1 T. R. 205; Dick vs. Lumsden,
Peake's Cases, 189. According to Emerigon, the unpaid vendor was not affected
by the transfer of a bill of lading. But by the Code of Commerce, art. 578, goods
cannot be stopped which have been bona fide sold, according to the invoices and
bills of lading, or bills of transportation.
102 T. R. 63.
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was divested. In ReWestzynthers,l the King's Bench decided, that
an endorsement of the bill of lading, by way of pledge, terminated
the vendor's right of stoppage, and was equivalent to an actual
delivery to the vendee; but that the unpaid vendor was entitled by
stopping the goods, to the surplus of the proceeds of the goods after
the pledgee's advances were paid off.
Knowledge on the part of the transferree, that the transfer divests
the vendor's right,2 or that the goods have not been paid for,3 does
not render such transfer invalid. But knowledge, at the time of the •
assignment, that the assignor was insolvent4 would make the trans-
action dishonest.
The transfer of a bill of lading which has been fraudulently
obtained, does not divest the consignor's right.5
In the case of Wilmsshurs vs. Bowker,6 in 1844, the carrier
signed a bill of lading to deliver to the order of the vendor, who en-
dorsed the bill to the vendee and sent it to him. The goods were
shipped "for the account and at the risk of the vendee." It was
' 5 B. & Ad. 817. But a factor cannot pledge his principal's goods so as to
divest the right of stoppage. Martin vs. Coles, 1 Ml. & S. 140; Newson vs. Thorn-
ton, 6 East, 23; Paterson vs. Fish, Strange 1778. And it makes no difference that
the pledgee was ignorant of the fact that the pledger was not owner. 1 Ml. & S.
140; Salomans vs. Nissen, 2 T. R. 674; 5 Ves. Jr. 213.
2 Cuming vs. Brown, 9 East, 506.
s Salomans vs. Nissen, 2 T. R. 681; 1 Camp. 104; Haille vs. Smith, 1 B. & P.
564; Walley vs. Montgomery, 8 East, 585; Coxe vs. Harden, 4 East, 211 ; 2
Kent, 550.
4 Vertue vs. Jewell, 4 Camp. 31; Haille vs. Smith, 1 B. & P. 564; Kinloch vs.
Craig, 3 T. R. 119 ; 2 Kent, 550.
5Osey vs. Gardner, Holt 405. Nor fraudulent transfer of goods to a person
who pays freight and charges. Lempriere vs. Pasley, 2 T. R. 485.
G 7 Man. & Gr. 882. It seems never to have been doubted but that the con-
signee might transfer his interest in the goods to a third person by an assignment
in proper form of the bill of lading. Vide Evans vs. Martlett, 1 Ld. Raym. 271;
Wrigbt vs. Campbell, 4 Burr. 2046, 1 Blk. 628; Caldwell vs. Ball, 1 T. R. 205.
The doubt which arose in Lickbarrow's case was, whether this assignment by the
consignee divested the consignor's right of stoppage; vide Whitaker, 209 et seq.
In the absence of contradictory evidence, the statement in the bill of lading that
the goods were shipped by the agent of the vendee, is conclusive evidence of
delivery to the purchaser. Meletopulo vs. Ranking, 6 Lend. Jur. 1095.
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held that the vendor could not stop the goods after the vendee had
received the bill of lading.
The law is not yet established as regards the divesting the ven-
dor's right of stoppage by other documents. There have been
several nisi prius decisions, but they conflict, and we feel unwilling
to give an opinion without having an opportunity of stating the
grounds upon which it is founded.
The right of stoppage can only be exercised upon the actual or
reasonably expected insolvency of the vendee.
This is a limitation which flows from the equitable origin of the
law on this subject. It was clearly and forcibly expressed by Lord
Stowell, in the case of the Constantia.1  He says, "it is not an
unlimited power which is vested in the consignor to vary the con-
signment at his pleasure. It is a privilege allowed to the seller to
protect him against the insolvency of the consignee. Certainly it
is not necessary that the person should be insolvent at the time.
If the insolvency happens before the arrival, it would be sufficient,
I conceive, to justify what has been done, and to entitle the shipper
to the benefit of what has been done. But if the person is not
insolvent, the ground is not laid on which alone such a privilege is
founded. The mercantile law is clear and distinct, that the seller
has not a right to vary the consignment, except in the case above
stated.
The French law2 on this point is identical'with the English, and
the same principle was maintained in the case of St. Jose Indiano,'
by Story, J. In the case of .Naylor vs. Dennie,4 Parker, Ch. J.
1 6 Rob. Adm. R. 327, Chapman vs. Lathrop, 6 Cow. 110. Becoming insolvent,
means becoming unable to pay one's debts, and does not signify going into bank-
ruptcy. Biddlecombe vs. Bond, 4 A. & E. 332; vide Coward vs. Atlantic Insurance
Co. 1 Peters, 386.
21 Emerigon, 317 & 318.
3 1 Wheat. 208, vide et etiam Wood vs. Roach, 2 Dall. 180; Buckley vs. Furniss,
15 Wend. 137. In Walley vs. Montgomery, 5 East, 584, it was held that the con-
signee having accepted bills, the consignor could not stop the goods and demand
immediate payment, the consignee not having failed Stanton vs. Eager, 16 Pick.
475.
4 8 Mass. 205.
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says: "We do not find that the right of stoppage dependsupon the
declared insolvency or open bankruptcy of the vendee before the
arrival of the goods. It is enough that his affairs are so involved
that he is unable to pay for the goods, if he was to pay for them
upon delivery, or that he shall have become actually insolvent
before he shall have taken possession." But if the vendor knew at
the time of the sale that the vendee was insolvent, he will not be
entitled to stop the goods.'
With regard to the manner of exercising the right of stoppage
in transitu:
It is now decided that the mere bankruptcy of the vendee does
not of itself operate as a countermand of his previous order.2  In
Scott vs. Petit,' a doubt was raised on this point, but it was after-
wards dispelled by the court.
In the case of Tiiseman vs. Vanderput,4 being the earliest case
extant upon this subject, the court held that the vendor was entitled
to get his goods back by "any means ;" and Lord Hardwicke held,
in ,Snee vs. Prescott,' that he might lawfully get possession of his
property by any means short of absolute violence. The same doc-
trine has been maintained in subsequent cases.
6
It was formerly held by Lord Hardwicke, in the case of Nort,ey
vs. Field,7 that the vendor must actually repossess himself of his
goods; but this rule has been relaxed, and in Mills vs. Ball,s the
court considered a claim or demand of the goods as equivalent to
taking actual possession of them, for the purpose of exercising the
right of stoppage in transitu. In Oppenheim vs. .Russell, and in
Boshtling vs. Inglis,"0 it was decided that if the goods were de-
manded by any one authorized by the consignors to receive them
1 Buckley vs. Furniss, 17 Wend. 504.
2 Ellis vs. Hunt, 3 T. R. 467.
23 B. & P. 469. Boshtlingh vs. Schneider, 3 Esp. 58.
4 2 Vern. 203. 5 1 Atk. 245.
6 Salomans vs. Nissen, 2 T. R. 674; Barnes vs. Freeland, 6 T. R. 80; Smith vs.
Staples, 1 Esp. 578 ; Ferze vs. Wray, 3 East, 93.
7 3 Esp. 613. 8 2 B. & P. 457.
9 3 B & P. 47. 10 3 East, 394.
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from the person in whose bands they were, that such demand was
tantamount to actual stoppage.1
But the demand must be actual and express, and not merely con-
structive or implied, and there should be at least a demand and an
attempt to get possession on the part of the vendor, and to prevent
them from coming into the hands of the vendee.2  We cannot find
any decision maintaining that a mere countermand is a sufficient
exercise of the right of stoppage. " If the notice is given to the
principal whose servant has the custody of the goods, as it was in
Litt vs. Cowleyj3 at such a time and in such circumstances, that the
principal may, by the use of reasonable diligence, communicate it to
his servant in time to prevent the delivery to the consignee it is
effective." 4
The stoppage may be effected either by the vendor himself or by
his agent, and this agent may be either a special or general agent,
provided the act be afterwards ratified by his principal s
But an effectual stoppage cannot be made in behalf of the vendor
by a third party not at the time his agent, even although the act
be afterwards confirmed by the vendor ;6 and an act of stoppage to
be effectual must in all cases be done eo intuitu.
Although in Mills vs. Ball,7 (1801) it was doubted, in the subse-
I Here we cannot help noticing the strong inclination shown by the courts to
favor the right of stoppage: For while a claim or demand is a sufficient assertion
of his right on the part of the consignor to constitute a valid stoppage of the goods,
possession is necessary on the part of the consignee to divest the consignor's right.
Thus in Northey vs. Field, 2 Esp. 613, a prior claim made by the consignee was
held ineffectual, while a subsequent claim made by the consignor was held suffi-
cient. So also in Snee vs. Prescott, 1 Atk. 245; Newhall vs. Vargas, 13 Maine, 93.
Nor will the payment of freight on the part of the vendee divest the vendor's right.
Mills vs. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457.
9 In Walker vs. Woodbridge, Co. B. L. 494, the vendor entered the goods "to
arrive" at the custom house, and this was held sufficient assertion of his right to
constitute a valid stoppage. In Bell vs. Moss, 5 Wharton, 189, the consignor's
agent notified the consignees that the goods were not paid for, and that the con-
signors claimed their right to stop them. This was held sufficient, although no
notice was given to or demand made of the carrier.
3 7 Taunt. 169. 4 Whitehead vs. Anderson, 9 I. & IV. 518.
5 Holst vs. Pownall, 1 Esp. 240; Bell vs. Moss, 5 Wharton, 189; Lickbarrow vs.
Mason, 2 T. R. 63; Mills vs. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457, vide Paley on Prin. & Agt. 124.
6 Siffkin vs. Wray, 6 East, 371. 7 2 B. & P. 457.
IN TRANSITU.
quent case of Oppenleim vs. Russell,' (1802) it was decided, that if
the carrier should deliver, after a notice from the vendor of his
claim, that he would be liable in an action of trover brought by the
vendor, who might also recover back the goods from the vendee. .
Upon the arrival of the goods, the vendee may in some cases
decline to receive them.
The right of contracting parties to rescind an existing contract
till executed, or the rights of third parties have intervened, is uni-
versally admitted, when not in fraud or contravention of the bank-
rupt laws. 2  For "until an act of bankruptcy the jus disponendi
over goods remains with the trader, unless he exercise it by way of
a voluntary and fraudulent preference of a particular creditor, in
contemplation of bankruptcy." 3
Thus in the case of James vs. ariffln, where the goods were
landed, but the vendee declared his determination "not to meddle
with them, and said that the vendor ought to have them, and that
he would not have them ;" it was held that the goods had never
come into the possession of the vendee, and that the vendor was
entitled to them.5
Not only must this rescision be without fraud to the other credi-
tors," but must be assented to by the vendor ;7 his positive assent is
not necessary, as it will be presumed, or it may be inferred from
circumstances." But if an act of bankruptcy intervenes between
1 3 B. & P. 42; Litt vs. Cowley, 7 Taunt. 169 ; Patten vs. Thompson, 5 M. & S.
350; Holst vs. Pownall, 1 Esp. 240.
2 Vide Long on Sales, chap. vi. ; 2 Kent, 551 ; Lawes on Charter Parties, chap. iv.
3 Dixon vs. Baldwin, 5 East, 186. It is a question for the jury to decide, whether
the return was made bonafide, or from any motive of voluntary or undue preference,
vide et etiam Harman vs. Fisher, 1 Cowp. 117; Naylor vs. Dennie, 13 Pick. 198.
4 2M. &. W. 622.
5 So in Scholfield vs. Ball, 14 Mass. 39; Atkin. vs. Barwick, 1 Str. 165. And
the- precedent debt is sufficient consideration, Ferze vs. Wray, 3 East, 93 ; Naylor
vs. Dennie, 8 Pick. 205; Bartram vs. Farebrother, 4 Bing. 479.
6 Barnes vs. Freeland, 6 T. R. 80.
7Salte vs. Field, 5 T. R. 211 ; Smith vs. Field, 5 T. B. 402; Lane vs. Jackson,
5 Mass. 157; Widgery vs. Haskell, 5 Mass. 144; Mills vs. Ball, 2 B. & P. 457;
Long on Sales, 240.
8 Richardson vs. Goss, 3 B. &P. 125; Lawes on Charter Parties, 557.
RIGHT OF STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.
the offer to rescind and the assent, the assent comes too late to pre-
vent the operation of bankruptcy.1
In the case of Fidgem vs. Sharp,2 it was decided that the yen-
.dee, being in embarrassed circumstances, but not believing himself
insolvent and not contemplating bankruptcy, might refuse to receive
the goods. But if the vendee has once received the goods he can-
not restore them, because that would be giving the vendor an undue
preference.
3
What is the situation of the parties, after the right of stoppage
is exercised?
Even after the goods have been stopped by the vendor, the ven-
dee may claim them within a reasonable period upon offering pay-
ment. 4
The vendor may still sue for breach of contract, and for the
price of the goods sold, being ready to re-deliverA
We think ourselves authorized, although there are some opinions
to the contrary, in stating that the vendor may re-sell the goods
after a reasonable notice given to the vendee and his declining to
pay for them. In the case of Newhall vs. Vargas,6 it is said "the
right of the vendor to re-sell after notice of such intention and
reasonable time allowed to the vendee to pay for and take away
the goods, seems now to be admitted."
In the case of Longfort vs. Tyler 7 Holt, Oh. J.-is reported to
have ruled-"if the vendee does not come and pay and take the
goods, the vendor ought to go and request him, and then if he does
not come and pay and take away the goods in convenient time, the
1 Richardson vs. Goss, 3 B. & P. 125; Lawes on Charter Parties, 557.
9 5 Taunt. 639. The same formalities are required in rescinding as in making a
sale. Quincy vs. Felton, 5 Green, 277.
3 'ate vs. Ball, 2 East, 117 ; Barnes vs. Freeland, 6 T. R. 80, ; Long on Sales,
256 ; 2 Kent, 551.
4 Bloxam vs. Sanders, 4 B. & C. 941 ; Brown on Sales, 3648; 2 Kent, 541 ; Long
on Sales, 338; 1 Atk. 245; C. B. L. 394; 3 T. R. 466; 3 Esp. 59; 3 Esp. 585.
5 Kymer vs. Snrvercropp, 1 Camp. 109; 2 Kent, 541 ; Long on Sales, 338.
6 Taunt. 162.
6 15 Maine, 314, vide et etiam Long on Sales, 338.'
1 Salk. 113; Abb. on Sh. 619. This dictum was approved by Ellenborough,
Ch. J., in finde vs. Whitehouse, 7 T. R. 571.
